

SECRET
Security Information

File copy

Air

EOQH-5448

EE/FI/G

APR 7 1958

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt
Attn: FHB
Chief, EE

Operational/CALL
Staybehind Activities in Western Germany

1. While [] was here at Headquarters, the staybehind picture in Western Germany was the subject of several discussions. Not only the present assets, but general policies and plans for the future were discussed. Just prior to []'s departure, these matters were discussed by [], [], [], [], and []. The subjects discussed and the tentative policies for future activities were as follows:

2. [] gave us a review of the present assets and activities in the KIBITZ operation, and the loyalty, stayability, and security of the KIBITZ nets were discussed. It was generally agreed that we had valuable assets in the KIBITZ 6 and KIBITZ 10 teams, and that these teams should be kept intact, compartmented, and ready to operate. It was agreed that the KIBITZ 15 complex must be disposed of for a number of reasons, all of which have already been pointed out to you. The most important reason, and one that bears repeating, is the political implication of our being in any way involved with such a group with Nazi tendencies. No doubt you are aware of the political hay that the opposition party could make of our KIBITZ 15 net if they managed to roll it out on the front page of the German press. The recent furor in Western Germany over the resurgence of the Nazi or neo-Nazi groups is a fair example - in miniature - of what we would be faced with. Also, the political make-up of the present KIBITZ 15 net does not give it any stayability, and it is felt that, with the limited staff personnel available for staybehind work in general, we should not expend any effort in building up "first 60 days" assets. May we stress again that this group must be disposed of, and as soon as possible. Incidentally, we have discussed the KIBITZ 15 group with [] since his return to the U.S. and his opinions on this group coincide exactly with ours.

3. The following were discussed and general future policies outlined, subject to such changes as are necessitated by circumstances and approved by Headquarters:

DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES
20 11
5/5/81

SECRET
Security Information

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy ☐
(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒
(2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

a. The range of staybehind in Western Germany (excluding Berlin) will be all three zones of occupation, but does not extend into the Soviet Zone. The KUPINE staybehind effort in Western Germany will, for the present, be completely independent of ZIPPER or KUGOWH activities in this same field. As has been pointed out previously, Headquarters does not recognize the desirability of merging KUPINE and KUGOWH staybehind operations or operational personnel. *KuHOOK*

b. Targets and location of staybehind assets were discussed at length, and ^{KUPINE} pointed out that the only target list available to the field is one prepared by HQ USAREUR. While we recognize that the theater commander's requirements must be a major factor in determining any target list, it is felt that KUBARK also has the obligation to supplement or modify such a theater target list in accordance with over-all requirements as reflected in IPC, IAC, and other strategic intelligence lists. Therefore, it is proposed to draw up a consolidated list of priority targets (excluding OB on initial hostilities) to be covered by our staybehind teams. Toward this end we request the field to forward the list as drawn up by HQ USAREUR as soon as possible, and we will in turn prepare a consolidated list of targets which we will send to you as soon as possible for your comment.

c. The type of staybehind teams to build or attempt to build up in the future was outlined as follows. They should preferably be small units - of the magnitude of one W/T operator and one principal agent. The W/T operator and the principal agent should not have contact with each other until we actually give them instructions to make a contact. In some cases they need never actually meet each other; we should attempt to set up letter drops and out-outs which would eliminate the need for actual physical contact between the W/T operator and head agent. The principal agent, who would ostensibly have been well grounded in the tradecraft of intelligence gathering, recruiting, and management of sub-agents, would not actually recruit any sub-agents; he would, however, have spotted them and have submitted their names for vetting. In addition, we might spot for him such potential agents as come to our attention, these agents to be activated by merely instructing the principal agent to make contact in a prescribed manner. These potential sub-agents would then be recruited only after the outbreak of hostilities. Of course, the spotting and recruiting of the W/T operator and principal agent will have to coincide with the target areas, since we must assume the minimum of mobility under occupation conditions, and therefore the principal members of each team must be pre-located in the various target areas as determined in advance.

d. Our (KUPINE) basic objectives in the staybehind field were tentatively set as follows. Our principal objectives will be reporting of a quasi strategic nature, as differentiated from OB material on the initial phases of hostilities. We envision our teams as lying dormant for ~~30 to 90 days~~ after the initial outbreak, then the

30 to 90 days

SECRET

Security Information

principal agent would activate his unit, when required, by contacting the radio operator or out-out (or vice-versa) and begin to round up his previously spotted team members. They would then report on targets as assigned to them by Headquarters via their base station. In this way we could achieve the maximum flexibility with regard to the targets on which our teams report since the agents could be directed to concentrate on the targets of primary importance as of that date. Of course, in order to achieve the maximum benefit from the various teams without jeopardizing their security by directing them to attempt to cover a target to which they had no access, it would be necessary for us to have a reasonably clear picture of the access and potential coverage of the various potential sub-agents - with frequent revisions to keep it up to date.

It is felt that we should not attempt to build up large nets providing a more-or-less blanketing effect for the purpose of reporting OB during the initial phases of hostilities. This decision is based partly on our knowledge of the present ZIPPER potential in this field, and partly on our assumption that other (ODEARL and NATO forces in conjunction with the German national forces) OB reporting assets will also be covering this phase. We feel that our sole objective is the building up of assets to report on the second and third phases of staybehind intelligence - phase one being OB on initial hostilities; phase two being the period following the outbreak of fighting by some ~~at 30-30-30~~ ³⁰⁻³⁰⁻³⁰ ~~at 30-30-30~~, probably coinciding with the consolidation of enemy occupation of the over-run areas; and phase three being the long-range type of staybehind reporting on economic, political, and industrial as well as military and communications matters during the occupation of Western Germany by enemy forces (if and when this occurs).

It is not desired to develop KUEFIRE assets with a view to sabotage, retardation, guerrilla activities, or any other para-military uses, since these are KUEGON staybehind objectives. It is not desired to develop assets for political or propaganda purposes since these are KUEGON objectives.

4. The problem of staff personnel was discussed; however, it will be treated separately in other communications.

5. The problem of cover for staff personnel was also discussed, and will be treated separately also. Suffice it to say that Headquarters recognizes the cover problem existent in staybehind activities handled from FRB.

6. We realize that this is a very general outline of our anticipated program for future staybehind activities in Western Germany, and we would be glad to elaborate on any points that are not clear to you, or any points that you may not be willing to accept as stated. In the absence of any objections or criticisms, we will assume that you accept these general statements as a working policy for future activities in the West German staybehind field.

SECRET

Security Information

7. If you will forward as soon as possible the target list made up by HQ USAREUR we will attempt to provide you with a consolidated target list for your study and comment at an early date.

P.S. Since preparation of this dispatch, conversations with [] indicate that by this time there should be available a list of USAF KUFIRE targets as well as a list prepared by []'s office in the form of KUFIRE annex to the Mission War Plan. This latter list was taken to USAREUR for their review and amendment if necessary. In view of this, it is requested that all available KUFIRE lists be provided this Headquarters.

P.A.R.